

Central Intelligence Agency



Executive Registry
85- 1481/1

26 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Agency Liaison, The White House

Attn: Sally Kelley

Director of Agency Liaison Presidential Correspondence

SUBJECT

: Response to Chairman Goldwater

REFERENCE


: Referral # ID 298534

This is to inform you that Director Casey responded to Chairman Goldwater's letter of 1 March 1985, on 25 April 1985. Due to its classification, this memorandum is furnished in lieu of an actual copy of the response.

Executive Secretary

Attachment Ref ID 298534







United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 30, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Ms. Sally Kelley

Director of Agency Liaison Fresidential Correspondence

The White House

SUBJECT:

March 1, 1985 Letter from

Barry Goldwater ID # 298534


The attached correspondence was sent directly to the Department of State for direct reply with a comeback copy.

We have reviewed the correspondence and believe that action on this matter more appropriately rests with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Office of the Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.



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Bill,
Mr. Casey called last
night and told him he would be getting a
copy of a leŧter from Goldwater re going
public with satellite imagery to support
political decisions in NATO.
main question is should he send a letter
to Goldwater with DCI's signature or should
it go to the White house with DCI's signature.
If to the White House to whom should it be
made out to. He hasn't received the Goldwater
memo yet, and would like to get an answer
to these questions today.

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	ROUTIN	G AND	RECOR	D SHEET	7
SUBJECT: (Optional)					1
Senator Goldwat	eron	Declas	sificat	cion of Imagery	
FROM:			EXTENSION	DDI-01684/85	1
C/IG/CRES Room 3 E 65 HQS			1	DATE	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and	DATE			27 March 1985	-
building)	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)	
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FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS



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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

DDI-01684/85 27 March 1985

NOTE TO: DDI

FROM : Chief/IG/CRES

SUBJECT: Senator Goldwater on Declassification

of Imagery

FYI. The attached letter from Barry Goldwater to the President was passed by the White House to State/INR for action. State bucked it to the COMIREX Staff which agreed that it appears to be a DCI action rather than State.

will take it up with Mr. Casey.

We have been expecting something like this since the 2 March <u>Washington Post</u> article on Gen. Rogers' testimony before the Armed Services Committee (also attached). And you will recall your recent memo to the DCI in response to his note to you on the Philip Gegelin article on the same subject.

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This document is UNCLASSIFIED when removed from attachment

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SECRET	25X1
SUBJECT: Senator Goldwater on Declassification of Imagery	
Distribution:	
1. DDI w/attach 2. ES/DCI w/attach 3. C/CRES w/attach 4. C/IG/CRES w/attach 5. IG Chrono w/attach	
DDI/CRES/IG/ (27 March 85)	25 X 1

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JAMES F INIGOVERN, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL ANNOLS L PUNANO, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

8508732

March 1, 1985

Honorable Ronald W. Reagan President of the United States The White House Washington, D.C. 20500 293534

.Dear Mr. President:

It is my opinion that our current policy toward classifying overhead photography of Soviet military activity is impairing our ability to win the popular support of some NATO nations for increases in their defense budgets.

The task of winning such support without the benefit of publicly distributed evidence of Soviet activity is particularly difficult in those nations led by coalition governments. In such nations, asking the public to accept "on faith" the existence of a growing menace to their security, is an act of extraordinary political

The traditional reason for not releasing this information has been that we don't want the Soviets to know what intelligence gathering capabilities we possess. I think that notion is becoming somewhat dated. Enough of this information has been released, whether intentionally or not, that the Soviets have a pretty fair understanding of our basic capabilities. Why we continue to withhold additional information to the detriment of our efforts to strengthen NATO, is beyond me.

I would be grateful if you would conduct a review of our current policies toward classifying and declassifying this information. I encourage you to make whatever modifications in those policies may be necessary, consistent with legitimate concerns for national security, to make this information available to the public.

With best wishes,

airy Gorewater



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	27 March 1985	
	MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD	
	SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with State COMIREX Member Letter from Senator Goldwater to President on Declassification of	25X′
	l. I received a phone call from Mr. Bill Deary (State Department) who informed me of a letter that Senator Goldwater sent to the President	25X′
25X1		
		25 X ′
	3. The White House has forwarded the Goldwater letter to the State Department for action. Current plans are for State to reply over the signature of the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. Mr. Deary expressed his opinion to me that this is a "sources and method" on this point. (In 1979, the DCI sponsored a declassification study, the	
25X1 ·	4. Mr. Deary is seeking our guidance on how to deal with this raise the matter on the IC Staff and provide him with any relevant	25X′
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	P.S. I have obtained a copy of the Goldwater letter and the interim	
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NATO Commander Sees Troop Shortfall in European War

By George C. Wilson Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States should reinstitute the draft to fill the projected need for 150,000 extra troops in Europe after 90 days of fighting, Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, North Atlantic Treaty Organization commander, told the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday:

"We're going to be short a minimum of 150,000 infantry, armor, artillery, combat medics" 90 days after a war starts in Europe, said Rogers, who wears the two hats of commander of U.S. and of allied forces in Europe. He has advocated the draft in the past on philosophical grounds. Yesterday, however, he tied it to the specific requirement of reinforcing Europe

Rather than pay bonuses to the combat troops aiready serving in the volunteer Army or extending their obligated service from six to eight years, "the answer is to have a draft for that purpose," Rogers said.

Under Rogers' recommendation, young men would be vulnerable to a draft lottery for one year. Those called would be trained in a crucially needed combat skill for four months and then be released to pursue civilian careers unless war broke out.

"Let's face it," Rogers said, declaring that his idea has no chance of becoming reality, "unless each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sit in front of you and say we must have it and the administration is going to support it, why, 'Old Bernie' [Rogers] is just whistling in the dark. 🦠 🏎

Well, I'm whistling with you, responded Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.). saying that he, too, favors reviving the conscription that was discontin- : ued in 1973 at the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.), another member of the Armed Services Committee. this week introduced a bill to establish a commission to the study the feasibility of requiring 18-year-olds to perform some form of national option.

The NATO commander, assess-

ing allied forces, said they were growing stronger but still could not stop an invasion of Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact nations. The United States could not get 10 dis visions to Europe in 10 days as reing that manpower cuts be made by laying from east to west for its milquired by the war plans. Rogers: limiting each service to a total number itary forces would beliming those
said, and would have to decide fair 1 ber of personnel rather than by my every would beliming those
by quickly whether to resort to me 1 posing reductions of a specific the 1 m Europe for higher decises spent
clear weapons.



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He pleaded with Nunn not to reintroduce last year's amendment calling on the Reagan administration to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe to protest U.S. allies' failure to live up to their promises to build support facilities, such as airplane shelters. Nunn, whose amendment lost narrowly, did not reveal his plans for this year.

Rogers complained that he is short of the people he needs to run the new weaponry being sent to Europe, such as the ground-based cruise missiles manned by the Air Force. The current ceiling on U.S. forces in Europe, backed by the Reagan administration and protested by Rogers during last year's budget process, is 326,400 troops.

"I need 10,000 more spaces, pri-

quest for fiscal 1986, which in Rogers supported releasing se-cludes the 326,400 person ceiling cret photos, saying that pictures of Rogers replied that he was request—the fuel lines the Warsaw Pact is

The basic challenge to NAT is to convince people that there is a threat to their freedom."


-Gen. Bernard W. Rogers

The basic challenge to NATO, Rogers said, "is to convince people that there is a threat to their freedom." He said that if NATO nations do not do more for their own defense, the Warsaw Pact could begin to look so powerful that European leaders might decide to give up rather than fight.

Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) agreed and said 🚎 he would press Reagan to release top-secret photographs documenting the Soviet buildup, Goldwater said that for 25 years U.S. intelligence officials have resisted releasing pictures taken by satellite for fear that they would reveal to the Soviets the extent of U.S. surveillance capabilities, permission (see)

"If the Russians haven't figured; marily for the Air Force, Rogers that out by now, same upon that they re not as smart as I think they re not as smart as I think they re not as smart as I think they are. He predicted to Rogers that they hard-nosed intelligence officials who oppose public release of the control experienced people home or holding officials who oppose public release off on the delivery of new weapons of the photos are now up against a and their support personnel: hard-nosed president who will Asked if he was protesting President overrhie them once he understands ident Reagan's defense budget re in the problem as the contraction of the problem of t

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FOR THE FILE:

The original version that came from COMIREX was re-written by DDCI. Then a re-written version was received from COMIREX.

The re-written version by DDCI was the one that was finally used--it is the most current.

UNUSED VERSIONS -- ALL COPIES DESTROYED.

All versions used the same TCS number.

25 Apr 85


Note having found a document sided by the

Not having found a document signed by McFarlane stating that the President has made a recent decision on imagery classification, the proposed letter to Senator Goldwater has been retyped to include the statement provided by OGC. The new version also contains several OGC-demanded revisions that effect only tone. These revisions, however, do not eliminate Mr. Sporkin's objection to the style of the proposed response which he is said to consider too hard.

I can support either the first version or this one, but would prefer not to see a fence-straddling response.




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To sum up, there is in the management of the intelligence process an unending conflict between the desire to use intelligence information available at any point in time to influence current issues (budgetary, political, diplomatic, military or whatever) and the need to preserve the secrecy of the intelligence sources to ensure effective future collection, especially in wartime. In recognition of the needs of senior US officials in Europe, steps have been taken to permit special use, albeit at the SECRET level, of satellite imagery and imagery-derived information. In my view, public release would be far more damaging than helpful to US interests. I am strongly opposed to such an action.

Sincerely,

William J. Casey

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